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Settlement Should Be the End of Story: A Proposed Procedure to Settle Hatch-Waxman 
Paragraph IV Litigations Modeled After Rule 23 Class Action Settlement Procedure 
 
Chika Seidel* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
A brand-name pharmaceutical company typically obtains a patent for its newly developed 
drug in order to protect its intellectual property.  If another company expresses its intent to market 
a generic version of the drug, the Hatch-Waxman Act authorizes the brand-name company to sue 
preemptively for patent infringement.1  Parties to the lawsuit may settle anytime, but antitrust 
issues arise when the settlement involves a “reverse payment” in exchange for delayed generic 
entry (also called “pay for delay”).  The Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, 
Inc. described a reverse payment settlement as follows: 
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two companies settle 
under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the 
patented product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, 
to pay B many millions of dollars.2 
 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) maintains that this type of settlement violates antitrust laws 
because it “may lead to higher prices for pharmaceuticals by deterring generic entry, and contribute 
to increased healthcare costs that consumers, employers, and federal and state governments are 
struggling to contain.”3  A counterargument to this is that an owner of a valid patent is immune 
from antitrust violation because he or she has “the right to exclude others from making, using, 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Rutgers University.  I would like to thank 
my advisor, Professor David W. Opderbeck, for his guidance and invaluable advice throughout the process of 
writing this Comment.  My gratitude also goes to Katherine A. Nunziata and the Seton Hall Law Review for their 
thoughtful edits.  I am grateful to my family, especially Daniel, and friends, for their love and continued support. 
1 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2013). 
2 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). 
3 Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Concurrences Journal Annual Dinner, FTC v. 
Actavis  and the Future of Reverse Payment (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/ftc-v.actavis-future-reverse-payment-
cases/130926actavis.pdf. 
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offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States . . . .”4  Pharmaceutica l 
companies in the United States are also free to set prices as they wish.5 
Lower courts have long disagreed as to the standard by which to analyze reverse payment 
settlement agreements for antitrust violations.6  The Actavis Court resolved the dispute by deciding 
that such agreements should be analyzed under the rule of reason,7 which generally requires a fact 
finder to “weigh[] all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice [e.g., 
a settlement] should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”8  The 
Actavis decision has garnered much criticism for its inadequate guidance, 9  because the Court 
“[left] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule of reason antitrust litigation.”10  One 
significant problem is that the Court did not rule out the possibility of “litigat[ing] patent valid ity 
to answer the antitrust question,”11 which defeats the purpose of settling patent infringement cases.  
Furthermore, the Court did not address whether the term “payment” encompasses non-monetary 
consideration.  Lower courts already disagree on this issue.12   Because of these ambiguitie s, 
pharmaceutical companies struggle to structure their settlement agreements to avoid antitrust 
                                                 
4 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2013). 
5 Valerie Paris, Why do Americans Spend So Much on Pharmaceuticals?  PBS NEWS HOUR (Feb. 7, 2014, 12:15 PM 
EST), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/americans -spend-much-pharmaceuticals/ (discussing that the United 
States has relatively low levels of price regulation of pharmaceuticals). 
6 Compare, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), with In re K–Dur Antitrust 
Litigation, 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012). 
7 Actavis, 133 S. Ct., at 2236 (2013). 
8 Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (quoting Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)). 
9 See, e.g., Lars P. Taavola, Jumping into the Actavis Briar Patch-Insight into How Courts May Structure Reverse 
Payment Antitrust Proceedings and the Questions That Actavis Left Unanswered , 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1370 
(2014); Kevin D. McDonald, Because I Said So: On the Competitive Rationale of FTC v. Actavis, 28 FALL 
ANTITRUST 36 (2013); James J. O'Connell, Editor's Note: The Elephant Remains, 28 FALL ANTITRUST 5 (2013).   
10 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238. 
11 Id. at 2236. 
12 Compare, e.g., In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 12-CV-995 WHW, 2014 WL 282755, at *6-7 
(D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (“the Supreme Court considered a reverse payment to involve an exchange of money” and 
therefore did “not extend the holding of Actavis to the non-monetary facts before it.”), with In re Loestrin 24 FE 
Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2472-S-PAS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123322, at *34 (D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014) (“Reading 
Actavis, this Court cannot help but find that it applies solely to monetary settlements”). 
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scrutiny. 
For private parties who wish to bring an antitrust action against settled parties, an init ia l 
challenge lies in the identification of settlement agreements—if they are even publicly available.13  
Since about 2004, pharmaceutical settlements have evolved to include a complex mix of side deals 
as well as non-monetary considerations.14   Private parties must parse various transactions to 
determine whether any of them are related to the potentially anticompetitive agreement.  Moreover, 
many private consumers are precluded from seeking remedies under the federal or state antitrust 
statutes even if they have been injured by overpriced drugs.15   The situation calls for drastic 
measures to remedy these problems. 
This Comment will propose a mandatory judicial approval process for settling Hatch-
Waxman litigations modeled after the process of settling class actions pursuant to the Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(e).  Part II will explain the relevant background information including the 
regulatory and legal developments as well as some of the existing problems associated with Hatch-
Waxman disputes.  Part III will describe the proposed procedure in detail.  Part IV will explain 
why the proposed settlement procedure is superior to the current settlement method.  Part V will 
conclude by summarizing the prominent problems associated with the current method as well as 
the proposed procedure and its benefits. 
II. Relevant Legal Developments in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
                                                 
13 The FTC and the Department of Justice have access to pharmaceutical settlement agreements, bu t private parties 
do not.  See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act  of 2003 (MMA), Pub. L. No. 108–
173, § 1112, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461–63. 
14 C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug 
Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 649 tbl.2 (2009); BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM'N, 
AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, 
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012, 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements -filed-federal-trade-commission-under-
medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-and/130117mmareport.pdf.     
15 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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This Comment can be better understood if the reader is familiar with the legal and 
economic concerns surrounding the pharmaceutical industry.  Subsection A discusses the 
relationship between the patent system and the pharmaceutical industry.  Subsection B describes 
the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its pertinent provisions.  Subsection C summarizes 
the circuit split that led to the Actavis decision, Actavis opinion itself, and its aftermath. 
A. The Role of Patent System in the Pharmaceutical Industry16 
 
In order to sustain their businesses, brand-name companies 17  must recover their 
investments in drug development.  An estimate shows that for every 5000 to 10,000 compounds 
that enter the discovery pipeline, only five make it to clinical trials, and only one receives approval 
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).18  The development of a single new drug takes an 
average of ten to fifteen years, and research and development (R&D) investment per drug could 
cost anywhere from $1.2 billion19 to $5 billion.20  These high figures are in part due to high rate of 
failure—95% of the experimental medicines fail to be both effective and safe for human use.21  
Even if they reach the market, only 20% of FDA-approved drugs will recoup the cost of R&D.22  
Furthermore, brand-name companies suffer a dramatic loss in profits when generic products enter 
                                                 
16 This Comment focuses on exclusivity rights conferred by the patent system.  The Hatch -Waxman Act and other 
legislation provide non-patent exclusivity rights for certain new drug applicants.  (See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355a, 21 
U.S.C. §§ 360aa–ee, 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii), (j)(5)(F)(iii)– (iv), 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3) (E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii)). 
17 For sake of simplicity, this Comment refers collectively to all companies that develop new drugs and file NDAs as 
“brand-name companies.”  In reality, many companies make both brand-name and generic drugs. 
18 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2012  pp. 29. 
19 Id. 
20 Matthew Harper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Pharma to Change , FORBES (Aug. 1, 
2013, 11:10 AM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-
new-drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine/.  Note that there are “[s]ome caveats, though: drug companies have 
tax incentives to count costs in research and development, which could inflate the figure; they also are likely to 
spend extra money in order to get those medicines approved in other countries. Even more important is the fact that 
some R&D costs come from monitoring the safety of medicines after they become hits to monitor reports of side 
effects.”  Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Intellectual Property Protections are Vital to Continuing Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry , PHRMA, 
http://www.phrma.org/innovation/intellectual-property (last visited November 4, 2014) (“[O]nly two out of every 10 
medicines will recoup the money spent on their development.”). 
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the market; competition causes the price of a patented drug to plummet, and within a year of 
generic entry, an average generic product “takes over ninety percent of the patent holder's unit 
sales and sells for fifteen percent of the price of the name brand product.”23 
A successful, patent-protected drug is vital for innovators’ financial future and their ability 
to reinvest in research endeavors.  The purpose of the United States patent system—“[t]o promote 
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive 
right to their [inventions]”24—is especially true for pharmaceutical innovations, as “new product 
development in the pharmaceutical industry is more dependent on patent protection than in many 
other industries.”25  One study shows that 60% of inventions within the pharmaceutical industry 
would not have been possible without the patent system.26 
Insofar as brand-name companies are dependent on the patent system to recover their R&D 
investments, there are indications that the companies have gone too far.  One strategy frequently 
employed by brand-name companies is to obtain “secondary” patents, i.e., patents protecting 
ancillary aspects of a drug other than its active ingredient.27  These secondary patents essentially 
extend the overall period of patent protection for a particular drug, but they vary in strength.  In 
fact, many secondary patents are considered “weak,” meaning that they are likely invalid or not 
infringed.28   The holder of a weak patent probably has no right to block the sale of cheaper 
                                                 
23 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: 
HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS (2010), at 8, 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-
billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf). 
24 U.S. CONST . art. I, § 8. 
25 Brief of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PHRMA) as Amicus Curiae In Support of 
Respondents at 7, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416) (citation omitted).   
26 Id. 
27 C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court, 339 Sci. 1386, 1386 (2013). 
28 Id.; see also Allison A. Schmitt, Note, Competition Ahead? The Legal Landscape for Reverse Payment 
Settlements After Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc ., 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 493, 503 (discussing that 
brand-name companies lose most litigations on secondary patents). 
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alternatives to its brand-name drug.29   Thus, a settlement agreement that operates to exclude 
competitors from the market is likely anticompetitive when it ends a dispute over a weak patent.  
On the other hand, even if a settlement excludes competition, it can be deemed pro-competitive if 
it allows generic entry before the expiration of the patent, especially if the patent is strong.30  In 
fact, the Actavis Court conceded that settlements on terms of permitting the generic company to 
enter the market before the expiration of the patent “would bring about competition . . . to the 
consumer’s benefit.”31 
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
 
Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act,32 “to strike a balance between two conflicting policy 
objectives: to induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to 
research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring 
cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market.”33  Prior to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, the FDA required brand-name and generic companies alike to submit proof of drug safety and 
efficacy through a New Drug Application (“NDA”).34  Brand-name companies were frustrated 
with the time-consuming FDA approval process, because the longer the process took, the shorter 
                                                 
29 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013). 
30 Id. at 2237.   
31 Id. at 2234. 
32 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).   
33 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. U.S. Food And Drug Admin., 454 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting aaiPharma Inc. v. 
Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002)); see also Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, Statement before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Amendments) (Aug. 2003), 
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm115033.htm. 
34 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); Barbara J. Williams, A Prescription for Anxiety: An Analysis of Three Brand-Name Drug 
Companies and Delayed Generic Drug Market Entry , 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005). 
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the remainder of their patent life became,35 and the more money they lost to generic competition.36  
Generic companies were also held back by the pre-Hatch-Waxman requirement to “re-prove” data 
that had already been established by brand-name companies. 37   Furthermore, generic drug 
companies could not perform any tests on a patented drug until after the relevant patent(s) expired, 
because such use could be deemed an act of infringement.38  These impediments delayed generic 
entry and prolonged consumers’ burden. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act addressed these problems in various ways.  First, it provided 
patent term extension for patents covering a new drug product subject to FDA regulatory delays.39  
Second, the Act also freed generic manufacturers from patent infringement liability arising from 
activities in connection with development of generic drugs.40  Third, it simplified the application 
process for generic manufacturers by implementing Abbreviated New Drug Applicat ions 
(“ANDAs”).41 
An ANDA obviates the need for generic companies to obtain all the necessary data from 
scratch.  It relies on the scientific findings of the corresponding NDA to demonstrate the safety 
                                                 
35 During the pre-Hatch-Waxman era, a patent term used to be greater of twenty years from the date on which the 
application for the patent was filed in the United States, or seventeen years from the patent grant.  MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, Ed. 9, § 270. 
36 The FDA approval process often took place after patent acquisition.  Williams, supra note 34, at 3 (citing Fed. 
Trade Comm'n, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study i, p. 4 (July 2002) (“[T]he effective 
terms of many patents were shortened due to the time required for the FDA to ensure the safety and efficacy of the 
brand-name company's drug product”)). 
37 Williams, supra note 34, at 2 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984) (the House Report commenting on 
the state of the law before the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act that “with respect to drugs approved after 1962, 
the FDA has adopted the view that generics must virtually duplicate the same health and safety tests conducted by 
the original applicant for marketing approval”)). 
38 See Roche Prod.. Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 860-861 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 856 
(1984), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (holding that the district court erred when it concluded that the 
generic company’s use of the patented compound for commercial development p urposes was not infringement even 
if it was necessary to obtain FDA approval.). 
39 § 156(a), (f)(1)(A), and (f)(2)(A). 
40 Id. § 271(e)(1) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make use, offer for sale, or sell . . . a patented invention . 
. . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which 
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .”). 
41 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j). 
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and efficacy of a proposed generic drug as long as the generic company shows that its drug is 
bioequivalent to the brand-name drug in the NDA.42  An NDA filer, a brand-name company, may 
list any patents that it believes to cover its drug in the FDA’s compendium called Approved Drug 
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known as the “Orange Book.”43  
A generic manufacturer seeking FDA approval must include in its ANDA one of the following 
certifications with respect to each patent listed in the Orange Book: no patent is listed in the Orange 
Book (Paragraph I); the patent has expired (Paragraph II); the ANDA filer will not sell the 
proposed generic drug until the Orange Book patent expires (Paragraph III); and the patent listed 
in the Orange Book is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic 
company’s proposed drug (Paragraph IV).44   A generic applicant must notify the brand-name 
company if its ANDA contains a Paragraph IV certification (“Paragraph IV ANDA”).45  Upon 
receipt of the notice, the brand-name company may do nothing, in which case the FDA may 
authorize the generic company to market its proposed product.46  Alternatively, the brand-name 
company may sue the generic manufacturer, because filing of a Paragraph IV ANDA itself is 
considered a statutory act of patent infringement.47  If the brand-name company sues within forty-
five days of notice, the FDA may not grant final approval of the ANDA until the earlier of the 
passage of thirty months or the issuance of a court decision that the patent is invalid or not 
infringed.48  Thus, the mere filing of an infringement action can provide “additional years of a 
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 § 355(b)(1)(G).  Eligible patents issued after the FDA approves an NDA may be listed in the Orange Book if the 
manufacturer files the patent information within thirty days of issuance.  § 355(c)(2). 
44 § 355(j)(2)(A)(v ii). 
45 § 355(j)(2)(B). 
46 § 355(j)(5)(B). 
47 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)–(2). 
48 § 355(j)(5)(B). 
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generic-free market, regardless of the merits of the lawsuit.”49  One commentator observed that at 
least twelve brand-name companies have actively used their secondary patents to trigger such 
thirty-month stay of FDA approval.50 
For the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer (“first- filer”), the Hatch-Waxman Act grants a 180-
day exclusivity period, during which other generic companies cannot compete in the market.51  
The drafters of the Hatch-Waxman Act may have envisioned the exclusivity period as a reward 
for the generic manufacturers who undertake the effort to invalidate weak patents.52  Ironically, 
this well-intended incentive has turned into a “‘bounty’ worth hundreds of millions of dollars for 
a major drug” due to its potential to keep the drug prices substantially high.53  Until 1998, the FDA 
required the first-filers to win the patent infringement lawsuit to retain their exclusivity.54  Since 
1998, however, the FDA relaxed the requirement to allow the first-filers to retain exclusivity so 
long as they did not lose.55  This meant that settling a case did not affect the first-filer’s exclusivity 
right even if the merits of the case remained unresolved. 
From a brand-name company’s perspective, paying the first-filer to delay its market entry 
makes economic sense.  First, the first-filer’s victory leads to a substantial loss of profits especially 
in a situation where the patent at issue is the only patent blocking competition.56  Outcomes of 
                                                 
49 Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: How Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to 
Maintain Monopoly Power in the Prescription Drug Market , 29 J. LEGIS. 21, 26–27 (2002). 
50 Id. at 34. 
51 § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv ).  If multiple applicants file on the same day, the FDA may designate more than one applicant as 
a “first-filer.”  U.S. DEPT . OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY WHEN MULTIPLE ANDAS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE SAME DAY, at 5–6 (July 
2003), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm072851.pdf.  
52 Schmitt, supra note 28, at 499 (citing Brief for the Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 25, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416)). 
53 C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1560 (2006). 
54 Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 14, at 658. 
55 Id. 
56 Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic Incentives Delaying the Resolution 
of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation , 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1788, 1800 (2011). 
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patent infringement suits are notoriously unpredictable and error prone, with patents being 
invalidated “more than 70 percent of the time.”57  “This means that the strongest of patents has a 
substantial chance of losing after a trial and appeal, just as the weakest of patents has a substantia l 
chance of winning.”58  Furthermore, brand-name companies have little to gain from their own 
victory because it likely collects no damages and does not prevent other generic companies from 
attempting to enter the market.59  Rather than putting their valuable patents in jeopardy and running 
the risk of incurring losses, many brand-name companies prefer to settle by sharing their monopoly 
profits with first-filers. 
More significantly, a settlement that delays a first-filer’s market entry creates a 
“bottleneck” period during which a brand-name company is able to engage in supracompetit ive 
pricing of its drug.  This is because a first-filer’s 180-day exclusivity period begins to run only 
when the first-filer begins marketing its generic product, or a court renders a judgment of patent 
invalidity or non-infringement.60  Thus, subsequent ANDA filers cannot enter the market unless 
one of them obtains a favorable court judgment against the brand-name company.  Brand-name 
companies avoid the risk of losing altogether by not suing subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA filers.61  
The ANDA filers have little incentive to initiate a declaratory judgment action,62 because even the 
winner in such lawsuit must wait for the first-filer’s exclusivity period to run its course, at which 
time other generics can enter the market and drive down the drug prices. 63  
                                                 
57 Rudolph J.R. Peritz, The Competition Question Unasked In Actavis: What is the Scope of the Patent Right to 
Exclude?, 28 ANTITRUST ABA 45, 49 (2013). 
58 Brief for the Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17, FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416). 
59 Herman, supra note 56, at 1800. 
60 Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 14, at 658. 
61 Id. 
62 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D) (A generic drug applicant may file a declaratory judgment action if the NDA holder 
does not sue on all of the Orange Book listed patents within the forty -five-day period.). 
63 Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 14, at 658. 
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Congress attempted to rectify the bottleneck problem by adding a forfeiture provision64 as 
part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).65  
The provision causes a first-filer to lose its exclusivity period when it fails to market its proposed 
drug by the “later of” the two conditions defined in subsections (aa) and (bb).66  Unfortunately, the 
problem of bottleneck lingers after the MMA amendments because the new rule still allows first-
filers to retain their exclusivity by settling.67  Furthermore, while the new rule continues to allow 
subsequent filers to trigger the 180-day exclusivity period by obtaining a court judgment, it now 
requires that the judgment come from an appeals court.68  Thus, incentives for subsequent filers to 
challenge patents are further diminished because even after expending their resources to win at the 
appellate level, the 180-day exclusivity remains with the first-filer.69  No subsequent ANDA filer 
is eligible for exclusivity upon the first-filer’s forfeiture.70 
C. Actavis and Questions Left Unanswered 
 
                                                 
64 § 355(j)(5)(D). 
65 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of U.S. Code, including § 355). 
66 The first condition under (aa) is “the earlier of” seventy-five days after the first filer's approval is made effective 
and seventy-five days after thirty months after the ANDA filing.  § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa).  The second condition 
under (bb) is seventy-five days after: a court decision, from which no appeal has been taken or can be taken, that the 
patent is invalid or not infringed; a settlement reaches a similar result; the patent information for the listed drug is 
withdrawn by the NDA holder; or the first ANDA filer amends  or withdraws the Paragraph IV certification.  § 
355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb), (q)(1)(G); see also Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 14, at 660–61. 
67 According to the FDA, as long as there is a possibility that at least one of the conditions in subsection (bb) could 
still occur, the first-filer would not forfeit its exclusivity.  Letter from Gary J. Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic 
Drugs, Food & Drug Admin., to Marc A. Goshko, Exec. Dir., Teva N. Am. 5 (Jan. 17, 2008), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Approv
alApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/UCM151237.pdf; see also Kurt R. Karst, 
Academics Criticize the MMA’s Failure-to-Market Forfeiture Provisions as an Anemic Mechanism for Parked 
Exclusivity and the MMA’s DJ Provisions as a Paper Tiger, FDA LAW BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/04/academics-crit icize-the-mmas-failure-to-market-
forfeiture-provisions-as-an-anemic-mechanism-for-park.html (discussing that the current statute does not counteract 
the problem of exclusivity “parking” by first ANDA filers). 
68 § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb); see also Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 14, at 661 (“The post-MMA rules 
make the relevant condition for defeasement an appeals court win, rather than a district court win—a condition now 
applicable to both post-MMA and pre-MMA drugs.”). 
69 Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 53, at 1586 (noting that settling with a first-filer “removes from 
consideration the most motivated challenger, and the one closest to introducing competition”).  
70 § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii); see also Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 53, at 1583–84. 
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i. FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 
Actavis revolved around agreements that a single brand-name company entered into with 
three generic companies to settle Paragraph IV litigations.  The agreements contained “roughly 
similar promises,” requiring each generic company to not enter the relevant market until sixty-five 
months before the brand-name company’s patent expired and to market the brand-name’s product 
in return for the payment of “millions of dollars.”71  The FTC initiated an antitrust lawsuit against 
all parties for “unlawfully agreeing ‘to share in [the brand-name company’s] monopoly profits, 
abandon their patent challenges, and refrain from launching [cheaper generic drugs] for nine 
years.’”72   As mentioned above, the dilemma in antitrust cases involving reverse payment 
settlement agreements stems from the unresolved issue of patent strength.  The pre-Actavis courts 
disagreed as to the antitrust standard for analyzing reverse payment settlements.  Some circuits 
applied the scope-of-the-patent test, under which a reverse payment settlement was immune from 
antitrust scrutiny so long as the anticompetitive effects fell within the “exclusionary potential” of 
the patent.73  Other courts employed the “quick-look” approach, which viewed reverse payment 
settlements as prima facie evidence of illegality.74 
The Actavis Court resolved the circuit split by holding that courts should employ the rule 
of reason approach75  to strike a balance “between the lawful restraint on trade of the patent 
monopoly and the illegal restraint prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.”76  In connection with 
the rule of reason analysis, the Court suggested that “the size of the unexplained reverse payment 
                                                 
71 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
72 Id. at 2229–30. 
73 See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012). 
74 See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012). 
75 The rule of reason analysis, in general, examines “whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”  Bd. of 
Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
76 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231. 
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can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness,”77 which in turn reveals “the payment's 
objective [] to maintain supracompetitive prices to be shared among the patentee and the 
challenger.” 78  The Court further stated that the size of a reverse payment may serve as “a strong 
indicator of power” possessed by the patentee to bring about anticompetitive harm.  79  The Court 
rejected the “scope-of-the-patent” analysis because “whether a particular restraint lies beyond the 
limits of the patent monopoly is a conclusion … not its starting point.”80  The Court pointed out 
that the “scope-of-the-patent” test overlooks the possibility of the patentee’s “serious doubts about 
the patent’s survival” and objective of the payment “to maintain supracompetitive prices.”81  In 
rejecting the “quick look” approach, the Court held that some reverse payments can be justified 
under antitrust analysis.82 
ii. The Aftermath of Actavis 
 
While Actavis resolved the circuit split, it left more questions than answers because the 
Court left “to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation. ”83  
One unresolved issue in the aftermath of Actavis is the precise definition of the term “payment.”  
There are currently various ways to settle Hatch-Waxman disputes other than what was at issue in 
Actavis.  For example, settlements can take the form of a licensing agreement without any money 
exchanging hands where the brand-name company allows the generic manufacturer to use its 
patent.84  Since the issuance of the Actavis opinion in June 2013, district court judges have already 
disagreed on what constitutes “payment.”  Some judges have held that Actavis decision applies to 
                                                 
77 Id. at 2236–37. 
78 Id. at 2238. 
79 Id. at 2236. 
80 Id. at 2236–37. 
81 Id. at 2235, 2236–37. 
82 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
83 Id. at 2238. 
84 John Fazzio, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: Fault Lines at the Intersection of Intellectual Property & 
Antitrust Law Require a Return to the Rule of Reason , 11 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 13–14 (2006). 
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monetary payments only, while others concluded that payment is not limited to monetary 
payments.85  The FTC agrees with the latter view, noting that a brand-name company’s promise 
not to develop or market its authorized generic86 (AG) is a form of payment.87 
Furthermore, the Actavis Court did not define what constitutes a “large” payment.  The 
Court only suggested that “strong evidence” of anticompetitive activity may be found when the 
amount of payment is larger than what the generic would gain in profits if it won the Paragraph IV 
litigation and entered the market.88  At the same time, the Court cautioned that a finding of large 
reverse payment alone is insufficient to conclude illegality, because certain reverse payments can 
have lawful explanations, such as the cost of anticipated litigation, payments for valuable services 
promised to be rendered by the generic company, and “any other convincing justification.”89 
Yet another uncertainty arising from Actavis is when and how the question of patent 
validity and/or infringement should be considered.  According to the Court, “it is normally not 
necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question,”90 and the legal community is 
                                                 
85 Compare, e.g., In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 12-CV-995 WHW, 2014 WL 282755, at *6–7 
(D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court considered a reverse payment to involve an exchange of money” and 
therefore did “not extend the holding of Actavis to the non-monetary facts before it.”), and In re Loestrin 24 FE 
Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2472-S-PAS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123322, at *34 (D.R.I. Sept. 4, 2014) (“Reading 
Actavis, this Court cannot help but find that it applies solely to monetary settlements”), with In re Lipitor Antitrust 
Litig., No. 12-CV-02389, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127877, at *62 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2014) (In applying Actavis here, 
the non-monetary payment must be converted to a reliable estimate of its monetary value . . . .), In re Niaspan 
Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2460, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124818, at *32 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2014) (“‘[R]everse 
payment’ is not limited to a cash payment.”), and In re Nexium Esomeprazole Antitrust Litig., No. 12-MD-02409, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126954, at *75 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2014) (“[U]nlawful reverse payments are not limited to 
monetary payments.”). 
86 An AG is a generic drug produced by the same brand-name company that issues the corresponding brand-name 
drug.  Brand-name companies can market AGs even during the first-filer’s exclusivity period.  See, e.g., Alix 
McKenna, FTC Report Shows Increase in Pay-for-Delay Drug Settlements, REDBLOG (June 11, 2013) 
http://www.regblog.org/2013/06/11/11-mckenna-ftc-report/. 
87 Brief of Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs -Appellants, on appeal from In re Lamictal 
Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-995, 2014 WL 282755 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (No. 14-1243) (urging 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to reverse the district court’s determination that a brand -name 
company’s commitment not to introduce an authorized generic in exchange for a generic company’s promise to drop 
a challenge to the patent was not a “reverse-payment” under Actavis.). 
88 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235 (citing Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 53, at 1581). 
89 Id. at 2237. 
90 Id. at 2236 (emphasis added). 
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largely in agreement that the Actavis Court did not wish to disregard the merits of a settled case 
entirely.91  A challenge lies in defining the conditions under which the issue of patent validity and 
infringement must be addressed.  Furthermore, in cases where the merits of underlying litiga t ion 
may not be considered, it is questionable whether antitrust principles alone are sufficient to assess 
the anticompetitive effects of Paragraph IV settlements.  As one commentator points out, “the 
problem is that the ultimate competitive impact of a pharmaceutical patent settlement is really 
dependent on the merits of the underlying patent litigation . . . .”92 
III. Details of the Proposed Judicial Approval Procedure 
 
Bearing in mind the intricate interrelationship among the Hatch-Waxman Act, antitrust 
laws, and the public interests, this Comment proposes a judicial approval procedure (“proposed 
procedure” or “proposed settlement procedure”) that alleviates many of the problems associated 
with settling Paragraph IV litigations. 93  The procedure mirrors the framework of Rule 23(e) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 94  which requires judicial approval of any “settlement, 
                                                 
91 See, e.g., FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-CV-2141, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102958, at *15 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 
2014) (“[I]n my view, the use of the word ‘normally’ reflects the Court's expression that under certain discrete 
circumstances there could be situations where the validity of the patent should be litigated within a reverse payment 
antitrust trial.”); Lars P. Taavola, The 30th Anniversary of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Jumping into the Actavis Briar 
Patch–Insight into How Courts May Structure Reverse Payment Antitrust Proceedings and the Questions that 
Actavis Left Unanswered, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1370, 1406 (2014) (“[T]he rule-of-reason approach may 
encourage the parties, at least in part, to argue the merits of the underlying case.”).  See also Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 
2238 (The Court cautions against “the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the 
other, consideration of every possible fact or theory.”). 
92 Kevin McDonald, Because I Said So: On the Competitive Rationale of FTC v. Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST ABA 36, 
38 (2013) (quoting Thomas B. Leary, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Issues in the Settlement of 
Pharmaceuticals Patent Disputes, Part ll at n.27, Address Before the American Bar Association Healthcare Program 
(May 17, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ leary/learypharmaceuticalsettlement.shtm.). 
93 The proposed procedure focuses on the settlements of actions that were initiated within forty-five days of 
Paragraph IV notice.  However, the same model may apply to settlements of other types of actions based on 
Paragraph IV certifications.  For example, brand-name companies may strategically choose to initiate a lawsuit 
based on Paragraph IV filings after the expiration of forty-five days or wait for the Paragraph IV filer to file a 
declaratory judgment action against them.  The same anticompetitive concerns discussed in this Comment would 
apply to settlements of such actions, because they can involve a payment, delayed generic entry, and retention of the 
180-day exclusivity period. 
94 At least one commentator has casually suggested using Rule 23(e) settlement procedure as a model to settle 
Paragraph IV litigations, but without exploring the topic in detail.  See Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 
14, at 640. 
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voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class” in a class 
action.95 
Perhaps the initial reaction to adopting Rule 23(e) may be that Paragraph IV litigations are 
not class actions.  When parties to a Paragraph IV litigation settle, non-parties (e.g., members of 
the public) will not be legally bound by the settlement terms in the same way class members would 
be bound in a class action settlement.   However, common law sometimes calls for judicial review 
and approval, particularly if a settlement “affects the rights of non-parties or non-settling parties, 
or where the settlement is executed by a party acting in a representative capacity.”96  The Hatch-
Waxman lawsuits satisfy both criteria.  First, the Hatch-Waxman procedural framework is 
“intended to benefit parties beyond those named in the action.”97  The outcome of a Paragraph IV 
litigation affects accessibility of drugs for patients who have the right to healthcare98 but are non-
parties to the action.  It also influences drug availability to the public in the future, because a bad 
patent often causes other companies to forgo R&D in the field it improperly covers.99  Reduced 
participation in R&D hampers innovation and results in fewer treatment options for patients.   
Second, Paragraph IV filers act in place of the public by virtue of challenging unwarranted 
patents.100   In case of Paragraph IV litigations involving weak patents, it is overwhelmingly 
procompetitive and beneficial to the public when a Paragraph IV filer prevails.  But the interests 
                                                 
95 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
96 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (Fourth) § 13.14 at 172 (2004) [hereinafter “MANUAL”]. 
97 David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch -Waxman Patent 
Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1338 (June 2010). 
98 See, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. H12,623, H12,848 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (“[T]his bill will do for America what we 
should have done 100 years ago: provide health care for all Americans as a matter of right, not as a matter of 
privilege.”) (statement of Rep. Braley); 155 Cong. Rec. H12,598, H12,619 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (“Every 
American deserves the promise of quality affordable health care, and this is our moment to fulfill that promise.”) 
(statement of Rep. Langevin).  This  Comment refrains from discussing the issue of whether illegal immigrants have 
the right to healthcare. 
99 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY, at 5 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-
competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf. 
100 Opderbeck, supra note 97, at 1338. 
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of Paragraph IV filers and the public do not exactly align, because victory in litigation is not 
necessarily the ultimate goal of Paragraph IV filers.101  When a Paragraph IV filer prevails in 
litigation and enters the market, it is often true that “the total profits of the patent holder and the 
generic manufacturer on the drug in the competitive market will be lower than the total profits of 
the patent holder alone under a patent-conferred monopoly.”102  Therefore, it makes economic 
sense for a Paragraph IV filer to settle by delaying its market entry and reap the benefit of the 
resulting monopoly as long as the value of the filer’s share exceeds the anticipated gain from 
litigious victory.  A Paragraph IV filer no longer acts in a representative capacity when it settles 
an action involving a weak patent, because the public is denied access to generic drugs.   
Today, patients who are on at least one prescription drug make up anywhere from 50% to 
70% of the population.103  The FTC estimates that pay for delay settlements add $35 billion to 
consumers’ out-of-pocket expenses and $12 billion or more to the federal government over a ten 
year period.104  In 2013, 21% of adults in the United States discontinued or skipped prescription 
doses because of high cost.105  Considering the profound impact of pharmaceutical litigations on 
public health, members of the public affected by Paragraph IV litigations are analogous to class 
members in class action lawsuits. 
The requirement of judicial approval is not a new concept.  The Federal Rule of Civil 
                                                 
101 Robert E. Colletti, The Role of the Food and Drug Attorney in Hatch-Waxman Lawsuits, Food and Drug 
Settlements and Negotiations, in Inside the Minds: Food and Drug Settlements and Negotiations (2006) (discussing 
various ways in which generic companies benefit from filing an ANDA regardless of first -to-file status). 
102 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006). 
103 Qiuping Gu et al., Prescription Drug Use Continues to Increase: U.S. Prescription Drug Data for 2007-2008, 
NCHS Data Brief No. 42, at 6 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db42.pdf; Wenjun Zhong, et al., Age 
and Sex Patterns of Drug Prescribing in a Defined American Population , 88 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 7, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mayocp.2013.04.021.   
104 Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Center for American Progress, “Pay-for-Delay” 
Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can Stop Antico mpetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers’ 
Wallets, and Help Pay for Healthcare Reform (The $35 Billion Solution)  (June 23, 2009), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/pay-delay-settlements-pharmaceutical-industry-
how-congress-can-stop-anticompetitive-conduct-protect/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf. 
105 Paris, supra note 5 (citing 2013 Commonwealth Fund International Health Policy Survey). 
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Procedure 23.1(c) requires a directive similar to Rule 23(e) approval process to “settle[ ], 
voluntarily dismiss[], or compromise[]” a shareholder derivative action.106  Another example is 
New York State’s Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, which requires a judicial approval proceeding 
before a charitable corporation can dispose of its assets. 107  With the state attorney general serving 
as a statutory party to the proceeding, the purpose of the New York statute is to “ensure that the 
interests of the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation, the public, are adequately represented and 
protected from improvident transactions.”108  Some may argue that a judicial approval requirement 
undermines the general policy favoring settlements of expensive and time-consuming patent 
litigations.  The Supreme Court, however, cautioned against acceding to such practical concerns 
when there is “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.” 109   Within the Hatch-
Waxman regime, the public interest to balance innovation and competition far outweighs the need 
to settle in private. 
The following subsections describe the proposed procedure which consists of two phases.  
Subsection A discusses the initial evaluation phase.  Subsection B describes the formal hearing 
phase that enables members of the public to object to questionable settlement agreements.  
Subsection C provides additional remarks regarding the proposed procedure. 
A. Initial Evaluation of a Proposed Paragraph IV Settlement 
 
i. The Requirements for Settling Parties 
 
Under Rule 23(e), parties who agree to settle must “disclose all terms of the [proposed] 
settlement or compromise” to the court presiding over the class action.110  The settling parties bear 
                                                 
106 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c). 
107 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511 (McKinney 2014). 
108 Manhattan Eye, Ear, and Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1999). 
109 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013). 
110 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) [former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)] advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 2. 
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the burden of persuading the court that settlement is preferable to litigation by showing that the 
settlement terms are “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”111  The parties must also submit to the court 
“a statement identifying any agreement made in connection with the proposal,”112 including any 
undertakings “that, although seemingly separate, may have influenced the terms of the settlement 
by trading away possible advantages for the class in return for advantages for others.”113  The 
disclosure may be supplemented by briefs, motions, or informal presentations by the settling 
parties.114 
Similarly, the proposed procedure requires parties to a Paragraph IV litigation to submit 
their proposed settlement agreement to the court in which their case is pending.  The settling parties 
bear the burden of persuading the court that their agreement is not unreasonably anticompetit ive.  
The submitted agreement may be in the form of a summary in lieu of a copy of the actual agreement 
as long as it sufficiently describes all material terms.  The parties should also be required to disclose  
any agreement or undertakings that, “although seemingly separate, may have influenced the terms 
of the settlement”115 by trading away potential benefits to the public.  Such disclosure includes 
other settlements and pending actions involving the same parties.  “Doubts should be resolved in 
favor of identification.”116   Rule 23(e)(3) does not specify sanctions for failure to identify an 
agreement or an undertaking connected with the settlement,117 but the Federal Judicial Center 
suggests to reopen the approved settlement if the unidentified materials bear significantly on the 
                                                 
111 MANUAL, § 21.631, at 318. 
112 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3). 
113 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) [former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)] advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 2. 
114 MANUAL, § 21.632, at 320–21. 
115 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) [former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)] advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 2. 
116 Id. 
117 MANUAL, § 21.631, at 320. 
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settlement’s reasonableness.118  The proposed procedure should simulate this sanction by voiding 
the presumptive legality of an approved agreement as described below.119 
ii. The Court’s Role 
 
The judicial role under Rule 23(e) is limited to approving, disapproving, or imposing 
conditions on a proposed settlement.120   In conducting a preliminary review of a class action 
settlement, the court must “adopt the role of a skeptical client and critically examine” the terms of 
the proposed settlement. 121   This aspect is crucial, because once parties agree to settle, the 
adversarial nature of litigation is lost.  Some circuit courts have even stated that “the district court 
acts as a fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.”122  The 
court has discretion to direct the settling parties to submit additional materials in order to fully 
consider the proposed settlement.  The requested information may include any factors indicat ing 
the value of the settlement, e.g., the cost of litigation or the total present value of monetary and 
nonmonetary terms.123  The settling parties are given an opportunity to claim the protection of 
attorney-client privilege and confidentiality.124  
Similar to the Rule 23(e) procedure, the court’s role in the proposed procedure should be 
limited to approving, disapproving, or imposing conditions on a proposed settlement.  The 
presiding judge may not draft nor rewrite an agreement, though he or she may make suggestions.  
                                                 
118 Id. 
119 See infra Part III.A.iv. 
120 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The settlement must stand or fall in its 
entirety.”); but cf. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., No. 00-CV-0648, 2001 WL 170792, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
22, 2001) (conditioning approval of a settlement on parties’ adopting changes specified by the district court).  
121 John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: What to Do About Them? , 39 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 865, 889 (2012). 
122 Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975).  See also Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l 
Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001). 
123 MANUAL, § 21.631, at 320.  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, note to 
Subdivision (h) (“Settlements involving nonmonetary provisions for class members also deserve careful s crutiny to 
ensure that these provisions have actual value to the class”). 
124 MANUAL, § 21.631, at 319. 
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The court must play the “role of a skeptical client and critically examine” 125  the proposed 
agreement for its potentially anticompetitive effects.  The court may, at its discretion, direct the 
parties to submit additional information or briefs which “the court considers relevant to its review 
of a proposed settlement,”126 but it must provide an opportunity for the settling parties to claim 
work-product or other confidentiality.  In order to create a record for appellate review, the court 
should consider and record all materials submitted to the court. 
Rule 23(e) further authorizes the court to appoint a magistrate judge, guardian ad litem, 
special master, court-appointed expert, or technical advisor who assists in reviewing the terms of 
a proposed settlement terms, studying how those terms affect the absent class members, and 
determining their fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy.127  A court-appointed expert provides a 
neutral assessment and testimony regarding the valuation of the settlement or of its legality.128  The 
judge must determine whether such testimony will “assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or determine a fact in issue.”129 
In the proposed procedure, the court must appoint at least one expert advisor who would 
assist the court in identifying as well as examining any issues concerning the agreement terms.  
This is important to ensure the quality of review given the complexities of the Hatch-Waxman 
system and antitrust analysis.  Furthermore, as discussed in more details below,130 an appointed 
expert is instrumental in facilitating the judicial review as expeditiously as possible. 
iii. The Court’s Preliminary Review of a Proposed Agreement 
 
                                                 
125 Lopatka, supra note 121, at 889. 
126 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) [former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)] advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 2. 
127 MANUAL, § 21.632, at 321 & § 21.644, at 329. 
128 Id. § 21.632 at 321. 
129 FED. R. EVID. 702; see also MANUAL, § 21.632, at 321. 
130 See discussion infra Part III.C.Error! Reference source not found.. 
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Rule 23(e) requires the court to preliminarily review a proposed settlement agreement and 
order a formal hearing (commonly known as a “fairness hearing”) only if the court is satisfied with 
the “fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy” of the settlement terms.131  The court also makes a 
preliminary determination that the proposed class satisfies the statutory criteria.132  The judge may 
make these determinations with or without a preliminary hearing133  and seek an independent 
review of provisions that call for closer scrutiny.134  The settling parties have an opportunity to 
amend their agreement to overcome the court’s objections.135 
In class actions, factors that may be considered by the judge in evaluating a proposed 
settlement agreement vary depending on the nature of the suit being settled.136  Some general 
factors include but are not limited to: advantages of the proposed settlement as opposed to 
proceeding with the litigation in light of the merits of the claims;137 whether any attorneys’ fees 
claimed as part of the settlement are reasonable;138 the maturity of the underlying substantive 
issues;139  the extent of participation in the settlement negotiations by class members or their 
representatives, a judge, a magistrate judge, or a special master;140 the effect of the settlement on 
                                                 
131 MANUAL, § 21.632, at 321; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
132 Id. § 21.632, at 321. 
133 Id. § 21.632, at 320–21. 
134 Examples of questionable provisions include “unduly preferential treatment of class representatives or segments 
of the class, inadequate compensation or harms to the classes, the need for subclasses, or excessive compensa tion for 
attorneys.”  Id. § 21.632, at 321. 
135 Id. § 21.632, at 321. 
136 Id. § 21.62, at 315. 
137 MANUAL, § 21.62, at 316. 
138 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 3 
(“Whether or not there are formal objections, the court must determine whether a fee award is justified and, if so, set 
a reasonable fee.”); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We have repeatedly 
held that a district court abuses its discretion if it approves a class action settlement without determining that any 
attorneys’ fees claimed as part of the settlement are reasonable and that the settlement itself is reasonable in light of 
those fees.”). 
139 MANUAL, § 21.62, at 316. 
140 Id. 
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other pending actions;141 what other courts have done with similar settlements;142 the amount of a 
monetary relief provided for class members;143 and the value of non-monetary relief.144 
Similarly, a court undertaking the proposed procedure may evaluate the parties’ agreement 
with or without a preliminary hearing.  However, the proposed procedure diverges from Rule 23 
by authorizing the court to issue a final approval in specified circumstances.  This can be achieved 
through a two-prong analysis, with the first prong comprising a categorical test and the second 
involving the rule of reason analysis.  Under the first prong, the court utilizes certain pre-defined 
factors to decide whether to order a formal hearing.145  Since the burden of persuasion lies with 
the settling parties, they must submit any requisite calculations and analysis to the court, and the 
court’s advisor may assist the judge in evaluating their work.  With the development of case law 
in the area, this prong will evolve into a streamlined process.   
If the triggering factors are not found in the first prong, the court should conduct the rule 
of reason analysis which has been employed in various antitrust cases to interpret the federal 
Sherman Act146 and state antitrust laws.147  The court must balance anticompetitive harms and 
                                                 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 317. 
143 Id. 
144 In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 316–24 (3d Cir. 1998). 
145 For example, the court may set the threshold “Settlement Competition Index (SCI)” beyond which a formal 
hearing must be ordered.  Opderbeck, supra note 97, at 1328–48.  If a proposed agreement’s SCI falls below a 
threshold value and thereby fails to trigger a formal hearing order, the court may proceed to the second prong.  
Alternatively, a certain amount of valuable consideration from the patentee may be a  triggering factor.  For instance, 
the amount of considerations may be calculated using the method proposed in Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert 
Hovenkamp, & Carl Shapiro, Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 18 (2013).  Following this method, if the 
“otherwise unexplained” portion of the patentee’s payment exceeds a predetermined limit, a formal hearing may be 
ordered. 
146 E.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (The rule of reason is the accepted 
standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of § 1 [of the Sherman Act]);  Texaco Inc. v. 
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively applies rule of reason analysis, under which antitrust 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive 
before it will be found unlawful.”); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400–01 (1948) (“We 
apply the ‘rule of reason’ of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, to efforts to monopolize through patents 
as well as in non-patent fields.”). 
147 Molly Wilcox and Jason Yan, Antitrust Violations, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 837, 869 (discussing that many state 
laws track the Sherman Act). 
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procompetitive benefits to determine whether the proposed agreement as a whole would 
unreasonably restrict competition in the relevant market.148   If the court determines that the 
proposed agreement raises antitrust concerns, it must order a formal hearing. 
Because the case being settled is a patent infringement action and thus is not bound by the 
Actavis decision, the court may freely consider the merits of the case in applying the rule of reason 
analysis.  This aspect is particularly significant because “the likelihood that the patent will be held 
invalid or not infringed is key to evaluating whether a settlement violates antitrust law.”149  It 
would be necessary to take into account the maturity of the underlying patent issue and “the 
probable outcome of a trial on the merits.”150  Additional factors that the court should consider 
include, in no specific order: the proposed market entry date of the generic;151 whether there are 
other companies that settled with respect to the same drug at issue;152 whether there are other 
agreements entered into by the same settling parties;153  any other potentially anticompetitive 
provisions (e.g., no AG provision154); the extent of antitrust injury to drug purchasers (e.g., the 
extent of overcharge155); the brand-name company’s market power in a defined market;156 the 
value of net considerations flowing from the brand-name company to the generic company;157 and 
how other courts have treated similar settlements in the past.158  With respect to the last factor, 
                                                 
148 Id.at 840. 
149 Opderbeck, supra note 97, at 1336.  See also supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
150 MANUAL, § 21.62, at 316. 
151 See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
152 See discussion infra Parts IV.A.–B . 
153 See discussion infra Parts IV.A., D. 
154 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
155 See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text. 
156 “[T]he conclusion that a particular tying arrangement involving a patent is unlawful ‘must be supported by proof 
of power in the relevant market rather than by a mere presumption thereof.’”  Opderbeck, supra note 97, at 1331 
(quoting Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc. 547 U.S. 28, 43 (2006)). 
157 Edlin, supra note 145, at 18 (describing a net consideration as a total value of any consideration flowing from the 
patentee to the claimed infringer minus the sum of the patentee’s avoided litigation costs and the value of goods, 
services, or other consideration from the alleged infringer.) 
158 See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing the notion that court opinions create precedents). 
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certain forms of settlement may be considered a “safe-harbor.”  For instance, the Supreme Court 
stated in Actavis that parties “may, as in other industries, settle . . . by allowing the generic 
manufacturer to enter the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without the patentee 
paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.”159 
iv. Parties’ Options After Having Their Agreement Approved or Disapproved 
Without a Formal Hearing 
 
Under Rule 23, if the court finally approves a proposed settlement, an order of approval 
should include the court’s findings and reasonings.160  An approved agreement is presumed legal, 
and both the court and the parties must abide by the approved settlement terms.161  If the court’s 
decision is appealed, the decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.162  “An abuse 
of discretion may be found where the ‘district court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.’” 163  
However, “[w]hether an incorrect legal standard has been used is an issue of law to be reviewed 
de novo.”164 
If the court in the proposed procedure concludes after the two-prong analysis that the 
proposed agreement does not violate the antitrust laws, it may issue an official approval along with 
a detailed explanation of the court’s findings and reasons for its decision.  The settling parties must 
submit the approved agreement to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the United States 
                                                 
159 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
160 MANUAL, § 13.14, at 172. 
161 Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 475–76 (5th Cir. 2011). 
162 See, e.g., In re Nutella Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., Nos. 12-3456, 12-3457, 12-4629, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 
18544, at *10 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We review a district court's decision to . . . approve a settlement under the abuse of 
discretion standard”); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e review the determination of the 
district court [with respect to the approved settlement] only for an abuse of discretion ”). 
163 In re Nutella, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at *10 (quoting In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 
(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d 
Cir. 1995))). 
164 In re Nutella, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at *10 (quoting Rodriguez v. Nat'l City Bank , 726 F.3d 372, 377 (3d Cir. 
2013) (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 590 (3d Cir. 2012))). 
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Department of Justice pursuant to the current regulation.165   Similar to Rule 23, a judicially 
approved agreement is presumptively legal, and the FTC must appeal instead of initiating an 
antitrust suit if it wishes to challenge the decision.  The appellate court may review the district 
court’s decision only under the abuse of discretion standard.  The presumptive legality may be 
void, however, if the settling parties failed to disclose an undertaking in connection with the 
agreement prior to the approval, either deliberately or inadvertently.     
If the judge determines that a formal hearing is required, the settling parties may choose to 
(1) move forward with the hearing; (2) amend the proposed agreement to remove any obstacles to 
court approval within a specified time limit; (3) continue to litigate; or (4) dismiss the case under 
the condition that the plaintiff would not sue the defendant based on the product proposed in the 
ANDA.  If an amendment does not result in court approval, the parties must proceed with the 
formal hearing or continue to litigate.  The parties may not appeal at this time.   
B. Formal Hearing 
 
i. The Court’s Notice to the FTC and the Public 
 
Under Rule 23, the court must alert all class members to their opportunity to present their 
views and hear arguments regarding the settlement terms.166  For members who wish to object to 
the settlement, the notice instructs them to file written statements of their objections within a 
specified time and to notify the court if they also intend to appear at the fairness hearing.167  Class 
counsel—attorneys representing a class—must communicate any proposed settlement terms to 
                                                 
165 MMA, supra note 13, § 1112(c). 
166 MANUAL, § 21.632, at 321–22. 
167 Id. § 21.632, at 322. 
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class representatives 168  and ultimately to all class members. 169   Class counsel may convey 
information to class members in a variety of ways, for example by holding a meeting (especially 
if the class is small), or by creating a toll-free telephone number or a website to provide settlement 
details and court-approved answers to frequently-asked questions.170  An objector who testifies at 
the hearing may be “any class member who does not opt out” or any party to the settlement, such 
as “a shareholder of a corporation involved in the settlement.”171 
In the proposed procedure, the court should notify the FTC and members of the public 
before holding a formal hearing.  The notice should also include descriptions of the proposed 
agreement, and instructions on how to file their objections within a specified time and on how to 
notify the court if they also intend to appear at the formal hearing.  The notice need not include a 
complete copy of the agreement so long as it sufficiently describes all material terms of the 
proposed settlement.  Public objectors may include wholesalers, retailers, insurance companies, 
and consumers, regardless of their potential status as direct or indirect purchasers.172  Those who 
fail to object during the specified time—including the FTC—forfeit their right to object, appeal or 
initiate an antitrust action on the basis of the approved agreement.  
The court may instruct to provide notices in publications such as the Federal Register, 
magazines, newspapers, and trade journals.173   It may also be appropriate to post notices on 
                                                 
168 A class representative is “a person named in the complaint as the plaintiff and who has been determined by the 
court to be a legally "adequate" person to represent the interests of the class.”  The Federal Class Action Practice 
Manual, Glossary of Legal Terms Used in Class Action Litigation , CLASS ACTION LITIGATION INFORMATION (last 
visited on Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.classactionlitigation.com/glossary.html.   
169 MANUAL, § 21.641, at 323. 
170 Id. § 21.641, at 323–24. 
171 Id. § 21.643, at 326. 
172 The proposed procedure might raise an issue of standing with respect to objectors.  This Comment proposes that 
any member of the public should be able to object, but if necessary, the proposed procedure may impose specific 
standing requirements. 
173 See, e.g., MANUAL, § 21.311, at 287–88 (discussing various methods of distributing certification notices to 
unidentifiable class members after a reasonable effort). 
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websites or public places likely to be frequented by potential objectors.174  The settling parties may 
initially bear the cost of preparing and distributing the notice and later share it with objectors in 
agreed-upon proportions.  The court may appoint a public counsel similar to a class counsel who 
would be responsible for overseeing the notification procedure, communicating and coordinating 
with the objectors to consolidate similar arguments.  If no objection is raised within the specified 
time period, the court must still hold a hearing with its advisor(s) playing the role of an adversary 
to the settling parties.   
ii. The Burden-Shifting Approach 
 
In class action settlements, a court may approve a settlement only if it is “fair, reasonable, 
and adequate.”175  At a Rule 23 fairness hearing, settling parties may “present witnesses, experts, 
and affidavits or declarations.”  Objectors may also testify.176  Objectors may act individually or 
on behalf of class members.177  The court may set time limits on objectors’ arguments and refuse 
to hear the same objections more than once.178  If objections are to be withdrawn, the court must 
approve the withdrawal.179  If withdrawn objections result in modifications to the settlement terms, 
the withdrawal is considered as part of the settlement.180   Even in the absence or scarcity of 
objections, the judge must still consider diverse interests of the class and requisite factors before 
reaching her decision as to the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement.181  Class 
counsels must protect the interests of the entire class regardless of the position taken by objectors 
or class representatives. 182  The court may grant additional discovery if it is necessary for the 
                                                 
174 Id. § 21.311, at 292. 
175 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
176 MANUAL, § 21.634, at 322. 
177 Id. § 21.643, at 327. 
178 Id. § 21.634, at 322. 
179 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5); MANUAL, § 21.643, at 328. 
180 MANUAL, § 21.643, at 328. 
181 Id. § 21.635, at 322–23. 
182 Id. § 21.641, at 323–24. 
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objectors to demonstrate the inadequacy of the settlement.183   However, the discovery should be 
limited and conditioned on a showing of need.184  The court must also ensure that there is sufficient 
record of the basis and justification for the court’s conclusion.185  The court must explain the 
findings in writing in sufficient detail to class members and the appellate court.186 
At a formal hearing in the proposed procedure, the court may employ a burden-shift ing 
approach in applying the rule of reason analysis:187 the objectors must first demonstrate likely 
anticompetitive effects of the settlement agreement in a well-defined antitrust market; if the 
objectors are successful, the settling parties must offer a pro-competitive justification(s); if the 
settling parties are successful, the objectors must show that the settling parties’ justification(s) can 
be achieved through materially less restrictive alternatives; if the objectors are successful, the court 
must weigh the overall anticompetitive and procompetitive effects to determine whether the 
settlement agreement is reasonable.  The court should follow the general practice of Rule 23 
regarding limited discovery, witnesses, experts, affidavits or declarations and withdrawal.  The 
court must approve withdrawal of any objector, 188  and if withdrawn objections result in 
modifications to the settlement terms, the withdrawal is considered as part of the settlement. 
iii. Parties’ Options After the Formal Hearing 
 
If the court approves an agreement in the proposed procedure, the parties to the agreement 
may begin acting immediately in accordance with the agreement.  Only those who timely objected 
may appeal the decision.  The agreement will be reviewed under a deferential standard, i.e., the 
                                                 
183 Id. § 21.643, at 327–28. 
184 Id. § 21.643, at 328. 
185 Id. § 21.635, at 322–23. 
186 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) [former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)] advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 1. 
187 James A. Keyte & Karen Lent, Reasonable As A Matter of Law: The Evolving Role of the Court in Rule of 
Reason Cases, 28 ANTITRUST ABA 62 (2014) (discussing how most courts employ a burden-shifting approach for 
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Actavis, Inc.: When Is the Rule of Reason Not the Rule of Reason? , 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 43–44 (2014). 
188 See discussion on objectors infra Part IV.C.Error! Reference source not found.. 
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abuse of discretion standard as described above.  A de novo review is proper only in limited 
circumstances such as the parties’ failure to disclose pertinent side agreements or a clearly 
erroneous application of law.  Even if the approved agreement is ultimately found unlawful, the 
settled parties cannot be held liable in future antitrust suits or penalized for their actions during the 
appeal period in accordance with the agreement.   
If the judge disapproves the agreement after the formal hearing, the settling parties may (1) 
continue to litigate the patent infringement case; (2) amend the agreement within a specified time 
only to the extent that it removes or corrects the anticompetitive aspect(s) of the agreement; (3) 
appeal within a specified period; or (4) dismiss the case under the condition that the plaintiff would 
not sue the defendant based on the product proposed in its ANDA.  The amended agreement of 
option (2) would not be subject to a formal hearing, and if it does not result in an approval, the 
parties must (1) litigate, (3) appeal, or (4) dismiss.  If the proposed agreement is rejected on appeal, 
the parties may not attempt to settle or amend again.  The parties must choose between options (1) 
and (4). 
C. Additional Requirements of the Proposed Settlement Process 
 
i. A Strict Timeline to Avoid Delaying the Settlement Process  
 
Bona fide objectors in class actions can be beneficial as they assist the court in identifying 
areas of a settlement that need improvement. 189   On the other hand, objections delay final 
resolution of a settlement by requiring the court to consider their arguments.190  This “holdup” 
becomes more severe when objectors appeal, which can take years.191  Appeals are costly to class 
counsel as well as to non-objecting class members because they are typically not entitled to 
                                                 
189 MANUAL, § 21.643, at 326. 
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191 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail? , 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1624 (2009). 
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payment “until the legal process has run its course.”192  In contrast, objectors incur relatively low 
cost because their pay is not dependent on settlement approval, and they are able to minimize 
appellate litigation fees by recycling widely applicable principles on which to base their 
objections.193  Furthermore, an objector has an occasional incentive of winning attorney fees if it 
succeeds in making changes to the settlement in a way that benefits the class.194  The prospect of 
delay and financial loss has prompted many class counsels to pay objectors out of their own 
pockets to withdraw the appeals.195  This dynamic has given rise to a lawyer-driven phenomenon 
called “objector blackmail” by which class members extract a payoff from class counsel by 
threatening to file meritless appeals.196  Attorneys who routinely seek out class actions and object 
on behalf of class members are called “professional objectors,”197 of whom “[f]ederal courts are 
increasingly weary.”198 
Paragraph IV litigations are different from class actions in this regard, because monetary 
awards are typically not involved, 199  and attorneys for both sides are paid by their clients.  
Moreover, a settlement holdup would be desirable for both litigants in the Hatch-Waxman regime.  
If the proposed settlement procedure can be dragged out as long as possible, the brand-name 
company benefits from maintaining its status quo during that time—i.e., the ability to charge 
monopoly prices—even if the proposed settlement ends up being rejected in the end.  The 
defendant generic company might play along if it believes the later payout would outweigh the 
                                                 
192 Lopatka, supra note 121, at 865, 882. 
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overall cost.  Furthermore, when a brand-name company owns multiple patents of varying 
strengths covering a single drug, both the brand-name and generic companies would likely benefit 
from prolonging the settlement procedure.  For example, one commentator has pointed out a 
situation where a generic company prevails in a Paragraph IV litigation involving a weak patent 
but there remains a strong patent covering the same drug as the weak one.200  Because the strong 
patent continues to block competition, the prevailing generic company is effectively barred from 
marketing its generic product until the expiration of the strong patent’s term.  If the generic 
company is a first-filer, its victory that happens too early would result in a premature period of 
exclusivity that would expire pursuant to the forfeiture provision.201  It would not be feasible to 
wait to file an ANDA against the weak patent until the strong patent is about to expire, because 
winning the first-filer status is a race against other generic companies.  For these reasons, generic 
first-filers have begun to request a stay of the Paragraph IV litigation for the weak patent until 
closer to the expiration date of the strong patent.202  A stay followed by a generic victory would 
allow the first-filing generic to retain its 180-day exclusivity period and to create a bottleneck even 
after the strong patent expires.  This “stay” scheme also benefits the brand-name company, because 
the exclusivity period running beyond the expiry date of the last standing patent works to prevent 
full competition.  
The proposed procedure should not serve as a substitute for a stay,203  and thus, it is 
                                                 
200 Herman, supra note 56, at 1789. 
201 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D). 
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Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 14, at n.85. 
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imperative to keep the proposed procedure on a strict timeline.  Only in extraordinary 
circumstances should courts grant a request to extend any deadline.  The aforementioned two-
prong test204 and appointment of an expert advisor205 are intended to facilitate a timely completion 
of the court’s analysis.  Additional tactics can be implemented to ensure expediency of the 
proposed approval process, such as requiring the settling parties to make their submissions as 
concise as possible, creating a template for the court’s opinion, and expediting the appeal process.  
The court should also have the power to terminate a settlement procedure if it finds that settling 
parties are not negotiating in good faith or to impose sanctions on a frivolous objector.  
Furthermore, settling parties must be prohibited from giving, lending, or promising valuable 
consideration to or for any person, to induce another to object or appeal in the proposed procedure.  
Finally, objectors should be required to disclose their sponsors or any inducements they received 
during a relevant time period.  The inducements could come from not only the settling parties, but 
also other generic companies interested in the relevant market.  The court should be cognizant of 
the financial relationships among objectors and settling parties when considering their arguments. 
ii. Two Conditions Imposed on the Settling Parties 
 
In order to encourage settling parties to negotiate in good faith, two conditions are imposed 
on them once they express their intent to settle: (1) the plaintiff may dismiss the case only under 
the condition that it would not preclude the sale of the product proposed in the defendant’s ANDA 
on the basis of the patent at issue; and (2) the defendant may not convert its Paragraph IV 
certification to Paragraph III certification.  
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The first condition ensures that the plaintiff brand-name company utilizes the proposed 
procedure in good faith.  As discussed above,206  brand-name companies benefit from staying 
Paragraph IV actions.  They could abuse the system by filing a Paragraph IV suit with little 
prospect of winning, deliberately dragging out the lawsuit until the end of the thirty-month stay, 
initiating the settlement approval process, and finally dismissing the action.  The current statutory 
provision, 21 U.S.C. § 355, discourages such tactic by giving the judge a statutory discretion to 
shorten the thirty-month stay period when “either party to the action failed to reasonably cooperate 
in expediting the action.”207  But its deterrent effects are moderate, because even if the thirty-
month stay is lifted, the patent at issue is still in force.  A future lawsuit remains a possibility for 
the defendant if it launches its generic product at risk.  If the generic company subsequently files 
a declaratory action, the legal proceeding would prolong the period during which the public is 
deprived of generic drugs.  In a class action, a court approval is required before any voluntary 
dismissal. 208   The purpose of this requirement is to protect the interest of non-party class 
members.209  Similarly, the proposed settlement procedure should take into account the interests 
of those in need of generic drugs.  Thus, the first condition eliminates uncertainty as to the legal 
status of the proposed ANDA product upon voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff and allows the 
generic company to enter the market sooner.   
 The second condition ensures that the defendant generic company negotiates in good faith.  
Since the risks associated with Paragraph IV challenges are small, a generic company might file a 
                                                 
206 See discussion supra Part III.C.Error! Reference source not found.. 
207 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B). 
208 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval of any “settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the 
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209 Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Ctr., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).  See also, Malcolm v. Cities 
Serv. Co., 2 F.R.D. 405 (D. Del. 1942). 
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Paragraph IV ANDA against a strong patent to induce the brand-name patent holder to sue and see 
how the settlement negotiation plays out.  If the defendant finds itself in an unfavorable position, 
it can back out by converting its ANDA certification from Paragraph IV to III, which attests that 
the generic company would refrain from selling the proposed product until the patent at issue 
expires.210  This would result in dismissal of the action.211  Not only is such practice a waste of 
judicial resources, but it also exacerbates the power imbalance212 between the parties.  Therefore, 
the second condition fosters bona fide challenges to brand name patents. 
IV. The Advantages of the Proposed Judicial Approval Procedure 
 
The following Subsections A through E will highlight certain aspects of the proposed 
procedure and discuss how they address the prevailing problems surrounding the current Hatch-
Waxman settlements. 
A. The Proposed Procedure Informs the Public and Allows Third Parties to Intervene 
Before Antitrust Injury Occurs 
 
The purpose of Rule 23(e) is to “assure that any person whose rights would be affected by 
a dismissal or compromise has the opportunity to contest the proposed action.”213  Paragraph IV 
settlements affect people’s right to healthcare, 214  yet not every injured person is entitled to 
recovery even when the federal and state statutes provide private causes of action for those who 
                                                 
210 § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii). 
211  There has been at least one instance where the defendant’s conversion of its ANDA certification has resulted in a 
court dismissal.  See United Therapeutics Corp. v. Sandoz, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121573 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 
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U.S. 912 (internal citation omitted); see also Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Ctr., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 426, 428 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The purpose of requiring Court approval of a ‘dismissal’ or ‘compromise’ of a class action is to 
protect the interests of non-party class members.”). 
214 See supra note 98. 
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incurred anticompetitive injury.215  Specifically, the indirect purchaser rule limits recovery only to 
direct purchasers, i.e., persons or entities who purchased price-fixed items directly from the 
antitrust violator.216  This rule applies to the federal statutes217 as well as many state statutes that 
do not specifically repeal the indirect purchaser rule.218  In the pharmaceutical context, indirect 
purchasers (e.g., consumers) are precluded from bringing an antitrust action against those 
companies that caused delayed generic entry by way of a settlement agreement.219  Thus, indirect 
purchasers of pharmaceutical drugs often have no practical avenue to recover damages for 
overcharged drug products.  Even in the states that recently enacted the so-called “repealer” 
statutes of the indirect purchaser rule (also called “Illinois Brick repealers”), the statutes apply 
prospectively. 220  Indirect purchasers in such jurisdictions cannot recover for the overcharges that 
took place before the enactment of the repealer statutes.  In recent years, indirect purchasers have 
attempted to circumvent this rule by making claims under the state consumer protection statutes 
and unjust enrichment laws, but their attempts have typically been unsuccessful.  For instance, 
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Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 
1168 (5th Cir. 1979)) (“The U.S. Supreme Court has flatly repudiated such efforts to trace damages through multiple 
levels in a chain of distribution or to apportion damages between direct and indirect purchasers.”). 
218 See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 409 (D. Mass. 2013) (“[E]nd-
payors cannot assert antitrust claims under the law of states which have not passed [repealer statutes which 
specifically grant end-payors the right to sue for antitrust violations].”). 
219 Some exceptions apply.  For example in In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 349, 368, 370 (D. Mass. 
2004), retail drug store plaintiffs were allowed recovery for their federal claims even though they were indirect 
purchasers because they had been expressly assigned the rights of direct purchasers that had opted out of the direct 
purchaser plaintiffs’ class. 
220 In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., No. 13-MD-2460, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124818, at *55 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2014) 
([T]he end-payor plaintiffs may not recover for any overcharges incurred before the Oregon and Rhode Island 
repealer statutes took effect.). 
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consumer protection statutes have requirements that cannot be easily satisfied since they apply 
only to courses of conduct that are deceptive and fraudulent as opposed to merely 
anticompetitive.221  Many courts have also dismissed unjust enrichment claims brought under state 
laws because they would otherwise constitute “end-runs” around state antitrust laws and 
consumer-protection statutes.222 
Even in states that permit indirect purchasers to bring an antitrust claim, there is the 
fundamental problem of accessing private settlement agreements.  This problem also plagues direct 
purchasers.  As time passes, it would become an increasingly daunting task for anyone to identify 
any side deals related to the settlement.  Individuals who were involved in settlement negotiat ions 
may be unavailable by the time an injured party contemplates an antitrust action.  In some 
instances, settled parties voluntarily publish the terms of their settlement agreements.223  However, 
“publicly available information contains significant gaps.”224  In In re Lipitor for example, it was 
not until after limited discovery that all relevant side agreements were revealed: multiple litigat ions 
concerning two other drugs in the United States—Accupril, and Caduet—as well as twenty-three 
legal proceedings in thirteen foreign countries.225  In light of Actavis, settlements of Paragraph IV 
lawsuits will likely become more complex to avoid an appearance of a large, unexplained reverse 
payment.226  It is questionable as to whether publicly available information is sufficient for private 
                                                 
221 See, e.g., id. (The case was an antitrust suit in connection with a reverse payment settlement.  Claims brought 
under the consumer protection statutes of Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia were dismissed because no 
allegations of deceit were made). 
222 In re Terazosin, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1380 (“State legislatures and courts that adopted the Illinois Brick rule against 
indirect purchaser antitrust suits did not allow ‘an end run around the policies allowing only direct purchasers to 
recover.’”). 
223 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 197 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (Settled 
parties had made press releases regarding the settlement and its major terms.  Moreover, one of the parties submitted 
a redacted copy of the settlement agreement in a public Securities and Exchange Commission filing ). 
224 Hemphill, Aggregate Approach, supra note 14, at 647. 
225 In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-02389, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127877, at *33–40 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 
2014). 
226 See Amanda P. Reeves, Muddying the Settlement Waters: Open Questions and unintended Consequences 
Following FTC v. Actavis, 28 FALL ANTITRUST 9, 12 (2013) (“To eliminate as much risk [of antitrust lawsuit] as 
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parties to plead a cause of action that can survive a motion to dismiss or to recognize an 
anticompetitive scheme to begin with. 
Since settling parties in Hatch-Waxman lawsuits are required to submit their agreements 
to the FTC,227 one might argue that the FTC is better positioned to bring actions on behalf of the 
injured members of the public who have no legal recourse.  In fact, after Actavis, the FTC has 
reaffirmed its plans to focus on pay for delay settlements.228   But government agencies have 
limited resources and cannot satisfy the interests of individual purchasers.  Furthermore, politica l 
climate could shift an agency’s focus and resources to another issue at anytime.  Most significantly, 
the FTC cannot always be proactive in its approach to consumer protection.  Its enforcement 
actions could take place long after consumers have been injured. 
The proposed approval procedure addresses these public concerns and prevents 
unnecessary injury in various ways.  First, settling parties must submit their proposed agreement 
to the judge who must act as a “skeptical client” and “critically examine” the terms of the 
agreement for any unreasonable restriction on competition.229  Next, if the judge decides to hold a 
formal hearing, members of the public will have an opportunity to object to the proposed 
agreement and identify areas that need improvement.  Any issues must be resolved before the 
agreement is approved.  Third, the proposed procedure requires settling parties to disclose any 
undertakings that, “although seemingly separate, may have influenced the terms of the 
                                                 
possible, companies should . . . avoid structuring settlements that involve unexplained high dollar payments from the 
branded to the generic company . . . .”). 
227 MMA, supra note 13, § 1112(c). 
228 José P. Sierra, FTC reveals plans for Reverse Payment Hatch-Waxman, PHARMARISC.COM (Aug. 5, 2013), 
http://www.pharmarisc.com/2013/08/ftc-reveals-plans-for-reverse-payment-hatch-waxman-cases/ (“Ending anti-
competitive ‘pay-for-delay’ settlements is a top priority at the Federal Trade Commission, according to FTC 
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez.”). The FTC and the Department of Justice generally believe that any reverse payment 
settlements are presumptively unlawful under the Sherman Act.  See, e.g., Brief for the United States in Response to 
the Court’s Invitation at 21–27, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG at 11, 604 F.3d 98 (2009) (No. 
05-2851-cv(L)). 
229 See Lopatka, supra note 121, at 889 
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settlement.”230  The public would have access to settling parties’ information less any privileged 
materials or work product.  It would no longer be necessary for the injured parties to scour through 
public records to find fragmented information on a settlement years after it goes into effect.  Fourth, 
the judge approving a settlement must provide his or her opinion in writing which would be 
available to the public. 
B. The Proposed Procedure Deters Sham Litigations 
 
Sometimes a brand-name company can completely block competition in a particular 
market through a series of settlement agreements with multiple ANDA filers.231  Suppose a brand-
name company has an extremely weak patent that is blocking competition in a lucrative market.  
As described above, a weak patent does not warrant its owner to exclude others from 
competition.232  The brand-name company initiates a patent infringement action against the first-
filer and then settles, requiring the first-filer to delay its market entry and to retain its 180-day 
exclusivity.  This settlement blocks subsequent filers from entering the market until after the 
expiration of the agreed-upon delay period plus 180 days, unless one of the subsequent ANDA 
filers obtains an appellate court judgment that the patent is invalid or not infringed.  Suppose 
further that a number of the subsequent filers challenge the patent.  The brand-name company sues 
and then settles with each of them in order to prevent a court judgment of invalidity or non-
infringement.  Because of the complexities and confidential nature of these agreements, antitrust 
                                                 
230 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) [former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)] advisory committee notes to 2003 Amendments, ¶ 2. 
231 See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229–30 (2013) (FTC filed a lawsuit against all settling parties 
alleging that Solvay, the patentee, to have colluded with both the first Paragraph IV filer Actavis, Inc. and the 
subsequent filer Paddok to share in Solvay’s monopoly profits.  Solvay agreed to pay the two filers in exchange for 
delaying market entry.). 
232 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (“[A]n invalidated patent carries with it no [] right [to exclude others from 
competition].  And even a valid patent confers no right to exclude products or processes that do not actually 
infringe.”) (emphasis as original). 
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plaintiffs might be able to attack only some of them individually.  The brand-name company might 
prevail on the individual actions, even if the settlement scheme as a whole is unlawful.  
Because the proposed procedure would be imposed on first-filers and subsequent filers 
alike, it enables the court to identify an anticompetitive scheme before it comes to fruition.  This 
is achieved by requiring disclosure of any agreement in connection with settling parties’ proposed 
settlement agreement.  Under Rule 23(e), “[t]he spirit of [the disclosure requirement] is to compel 
identification of any agreement or understanding that might have affected the interests of class 
members by altering what they may be receiving or foregoing.  Side agreements might indicate, 
for example, that the settlement is not reasonable because they may reveal additional funds that 
might have been paid to the class that are instead paid to selected claimants or their attorneys.”233  
Likewise, the disclosure requirement in the proposed procedure forces the settling parties to put 
all potentially related transactions on the table, thereby allowing the judge to examine the parties’ 
motives and identify valuable considerations.  The parties may include with their disclosure 
explanations as to how certain side deals do or do not relate to the proposed agreement.  If any of 
such side agreements signal an anticompetitive concern, the issue can be resolved before any long-
term anticompetitive harm takes place.  The disclosure requirement also obviates the need to 
speculate illegality and spares the settling parties from expensive discovery years after the 
settlement takes place. 
C. The Proposed Procedure Increases Predictability and Protection for Settling Parties 
 
The proposed procedure alleviates the concerns of settled parties that they might face 
antitrust liability years after their settlement takes place.  The antitrust enforcement system is 
decentralized in the United States, and thus potential plaintiffs include the federal government, 
                                                 
233 MANUAL, § 21.631 at 319. 
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state governments, and aggrieved individuals.  A federal antitrust action may be brought under two 
federal statutes: the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.234  The FTC235 may initiate an antitrust 
action under the Sherman Act against parties for collusion (Section 1) or against a single party for 
engaging in monopoly (Section 2).236  15 U.S.C. § 15c also allows state attorneys general to bring 
civil actions as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons who have been injured as a result of a 
violation of the Sherman Act.237  The Clayton Act authorizes private individuals who have been 
injured “by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws” to sue and recover threefold the 
damages, as well as the cost of suit and a reasonable attorney's fee.238 
For civil antitrust suits under the federal law, a cause of action must be commenced within 
four years of accrual.239  An antitrust cause of action accrues when a defendant commits an act that 
causes injury to the plaintiff.240  In the Hatch-Waxman context, this means that the statute of 
limitations begins to run when settling parties enter into an allegedly unlawful agreement.   
However, the statute of limitations is not rigid.  In class action lawsuits (which is often the case 
for private antitrust actions against parties to Paragraph IV settlements), “the filing of a class action 
tolls the statute of limitations ‘as to all asserted members of the class.’” 241   The statute of 
                                                 
234 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7; 5 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53.  This Comment assumes that the interstate commerce 
requirement of the federal statutes  is satisfied.  
235 The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the FTC share the responsibility of enforcing federal 
antitrust laws, but only the Antitrust Division may institute criminal proceedings.  15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).  
However, criminal prosecutions are relatively rare in the Hatch-Waxman context because “criminal prosecution in 
general and imprisonment in particular have been confined to instances of outrageous conduct of undoubted 
illegality.”  Wilcox, supra note 148, at n.8 (quoting Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antirust Law § 303b 
(3d ed. 2006)).  Hatch-Waxman settlements do not normally fall within the category of “undoubted illegality,” 
because the issue of patent validity/infringement creates uncertainty. 
236 §§ 1–2. 
237 § 15c. 
238 § 15a.  This right of action is generally limited to direct purchasers of price-fixed items, i.e., persons or entities 
who directly purchase from the antitrust violator. See also discussion supra Part IV.A. 
239 § 15b. 
240 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971).). 
241 In re Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 219 (citing Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 353-54 
(1983) (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974))). 
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limitations remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification is denied.  
Potential class members may choose to file their own suits or intervene as plaintiffs in the pending 
action.”242  Therefore, parties to Paragraph IV settlements may face antitrust lawsuits from both 
the FTC and private parties more than four years after the agreement date. 
The settling parties could also face state antitrust actions more than four years after they 
settle.  Nearly all states have antitrust laws that typically authorize the state attorneys general to 
bring criminal or civil actions against antitrust offenders,243 and many state laws provide remedies 
for private plaintiffs.244  State statutes of limitations vary, but some states hold that the limitation 
period begins when the plaintiff discovers the anticompetitive act as opposed to when the 
defendants settle.  In Rhode Island, the plaintiff must commence an action “within four (4) years 
after the plaintiff discovered, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, 
the facts relied upon for proof of the conspiracy.”245 
Some antitrust defendants have attempted to claim antitrust immunity under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine,246 but courts are generally in consensus that “private settlement agreements 
entered into during the pendency of litigation that are neither presented to nor approved by the 
judge presiding over the dispute fall outside the ambit of Noerr-Pennington immunity. ” 247  
Furthermore, it is not clear whether a consent judgment falls within the scope of Noerr-
                                                 
242 Crown, 462 U.S. at 354. 
243 Wilcox, supra note 148, at 869. 
244 Kemper, supra note 215, at Part II.B.§ 9. 
245 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 6-36-23 (2014 West); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:9-14 (2014 West) (“Any action 
brought to enforce the provisions of this act shall be barred unless commenced within 4 years after the cause of 
action arose . . . .”).  
246 “The Noerr-Pennington doctrine grants antitrust immunity to persons and organizations who, with the intent to 
restrain trade and diminish competition, act in concert to petition the government to adopt laws and implement 
policies that are anticompetitive in nature.”  In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 394 
(D. Mass. 2013) (citing Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 (1988).). 
247 Id. at 395 (citing Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 818–19 (2001) and In re Cardizem CD 
Antitrust Litig., 105 F.Supp.2d 618, 634–36 (2000).). 
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Pennington.248  In In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, the defense was unsuccessful 
because “it [was] unclear whether the judge could be fairly said to have endorsed the terms of the 
settlement agreements.”249   On the other hand, there is an indication that sufficient judicia l 
intervention might lead the court to conclude that a settlement was sanctioned by a judge.  In In re 
Effexor Antitrust Litigation, the court deemed the payment arrangement as stipulated in the 
settlement agreement justified because the judge who entered a consent decree incorporating the 
settlement agreement did so after soliciting the FTC’s view on antitrust issues concerning the 
agreement and the FTC decided not to object within the prescribed period.250 
The proposed procedure improves predictability and builds confidence in the legality of 
Paragraph IV settlement agreements in several ways.  First, the proposed settlement procedure 
provides a limited window of opportunity for any party (including the FTC) to object to a proposed 
agreement.  Those who fail to timely object forfeit their right to appeal or bring an antitrust action 
based on the agreement.  Second, the court’s reasons for approval would be made publicly 
available to aid future Paragraph IV litigants in structuring their agreements if they wish to settle.  
Third, because courts’ approval or denial of proposed agreements would be published, precedents 
will develop over time, resulting in more consistent decisions nationwide.  Fourth, once a court 
approves a settlement agreement, it is presumed legal.  At the appellate level, the legality of an 
approved agreement is reviewable only under a deferential standard.   
D. The Proposed Settlement Procedure Mitigates the Power Imbalance Between the 
Settling Parties 
 
                                                 
248 Id. (“There is little guidance, however, on the question of whether a judge's entry of a consent judgment falls 
squarely within the scope of Noerr-Pennington.”). 
249 See, e.g., id. at 398. 
250 In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *37–40 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014).  
Note, however, the opinion does not specifically address the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 
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Under the Hatch-Waxman regime, there is currently an inherent power imbalance between 
brand-name companies and generic companies.  This is because a Paragraph IV litigation occurs 
before the generic enters the market.251  Under such circumstance, “[t]he patent owner [i.e., the 
brand-name company] risks losing its patent, [but] the alleged infringer does not risk a damage 
award.”252  From the generic’s perspective, the benefit of winning a lawsuit and gaining entry to a 
lucrative market far outweighs the cost of litigation, and thus justifies a challenge to the patent 
even with a 1.3% chance of success.253  The power imbalance also affects settlement negotiations.  
The generic company, knowing that it has little to lose by litigating, may demand a high settlement 
amount, and the brand-name company would pay that amount as long as it does not exceed the 
brand-name’s expected payout from winning the lawsuit.254  According to one study, brand-name 
companies can pay generic manufacturers between $1.75 million and $132.5 million for a delay 
period of between four months and ten years.255  Actavis provides slight leverage in negotiations 
for brand-name companies because “unexplained” and “large” reverse payments raise red flags, 
but the basic power balance has not changed. 
Within the proposed settlement framework, courts are in a unique position to mitigate this 
imbalance and manage both parties’ interests.  For example, the court may raise concerns when 
the generic company demands payment that is unreasonably high or market entry date that is too 
soon.  This way, the court acts to protect the brand-name company's need to recover its investment 
in research, which ensures continued development of new drugs.  Furthermore, by allowing 
                                                 
251 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(B). 
252 Opderbeck, supra note 97, at 1307. 
253 Brief for the Intellectual Property Owners Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 24, FTC v. 
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416) (“[F]or more than 90% of branded drug sales (measured in 
dollars), a generic challenger balancing upside gain under Hatch-Waxman against downside risk limited to litigation 
costs can justify the challenge if it believes it has at least a 1.3% chance of success.”). 
254 Reeves, supra note 226, at 12. 
255 Fazzio, supra note 84, at 14. 
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generic entry at an appropriate time prior to the patent expiration, it can facilitate an equitable and 
pro-competitive timing to introduce lower-cost generic drugs into the market. 
E. The Proposed Procedure Likely Enhances Predictability Which in Turn Encourages 
Innovation 
 
The current regulatory system does not necessarily “induce name-brand pharmaceutica l 
firms to make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug products while 
simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market.”256  
As with any for-profit enterprise, a brand-name company’s decision to invest in research is driven 
by economic factors.  Because pharmaceutical companies can spend up to $5 billion to develop a 
single drug,257 each drug that enters the market must generate enough profit to exceed these costs.  
R&D costs, however, are not the only financial concerns related to product development.258  A 
brand-name company may also take into account the likelihood of generics’ market entry,259 the 
cost of future litigations (including potential antitrust litigations), and the probability of successful 
settlement(s).260   If the occurrence of future antitrust litigation is so unpredictable, companies 
might overestimate the associated costs and shy away from particular research projects altogether.  
                                                 
256 Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. U.S. Food And Drug Admin., 454 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting aaiPharma Inc. 
v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
257 Harper, supra note 20. 
258 Brand-name companies are subject to additional financial strains.  For example since 2011, Section 9008 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act has imposed an annual fee on manufacturers and importers of “branded 
prescription drugs.”  Generic drugs approved under ANDAs are not subject to the fee.  Alan M. Kirschenbaum, 
Final Rule on Branded Rx Drug Fee Treats All NDAs the Same, but IRS Might Consider a Special Rule for Pre -
Hatch-Waxman Paper NDAs, FDA LAW BLOG (Oct. 15, 2014, 8:21 PM), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2014/08/final-rule-on-branded-rx-drug-fee-treats-all-ndas-
the-same-but-irs-might-consider-a-special-rule-for.html.  Furthermore, the Affordable Care Act provisions mandates 
drug manufacturers to provide 50% discount to Medicare Part D beneficiaries for brand -name drugs and biologics 
purchased during the coverage gap of Part D.  BARRY R. FURROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 781 (7th Ed. 2013).  Section 2501 of the ACA also increases the rebates that must be paid by drug 
manufacturers for pharmaceuticals covered by Medicaid.  Id. at 856. 
259 Murat C. Mungan, Reverse Payments, Perverse Incentives, 27 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 39 (2013). 
260 Id. 
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Even if a brand-name company decides to engage in R&D, uncertainty as to the antitrust 
legality of settlements may still cause the brand-name company to inflate the non-R&D costs.  The 
overestimation is justifiable since the FTC interprets the Actavis decision to be a “significant 
victory for the Commission.”261  Therefore, brand-name companies will likely factor in expected 
costs of antitrust litigations when determining drug prices, effectively shifting the costs to 
consumers.262 
The proposed procedure would improve predictability as to the volume of future antitrust 
lawsuits, because settling parties can structure their agreements in conformity with precedents.  
Furthermore, since an approved agreement is presumed legal, the likelihood that settled companies 
would face antitrust liability diminishes significantly.  Thus, brand-name companies would be 
encouraged to invest in R&D and less reluctant to lower drug prices.   
One commentator on reverse payment settlements has proposed a model that demonstrates 
the effect of the shift in legality of reverse payment settlements. 263   According to the model, 
switching from a regime that legalizes reverse payment settlements to a regime that illegalizes the 
settlements increases incentives for brand-name companies to develop stronger inventions rather 
than weaker inventions, therefore strengthening their patents.264  The model also shows that a 
move toward illegalization of reverse payment settlement deters generics from entering the market 
when the patent is strong. 265   The proposed procedure does not illegalize reverse payment 
settlements, but makes it difficult for brand-name companies to rely on them.  If this model 
                                                 
261 Wright, supra note 3. 
262 Pamela J. Clements, The Hatch-Waxman Act and the Conflict Between Antitrust Law & Patent Law , 48 IDEA 
381, 401 (2008). 
263 Mungan, supra note 259 at 41–44. 
264 Id. at 43–44. 
265 Id. at 41–42. 
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accurately forecasts the behaviors of brand-name and generic companies, the proposed procedure 
would encourage strong innovation. 
V. Conclusion 
 
The current method of settling Paragraph IV litigations is replete with problems.  Because 
the Actavis framework is full of uncertainties, settling parties currently cannot ensure the antitrust 
legality of their agreements.  The parties could be subject to antitrust scrutiny several years after 
the settlement, which requires them to revisit their settled case and incur additional costs.  The 
power imbalance between brand-name and generic companies in Paragraph IV litigations as well 
as anticipated antitrust lawsuits may cause brand-name companies to divert resources from R&D 
and shift costs to consumers.  On the other hand, interested members of the public cannot intervene 
before Paragraph IV settlements are finalized and are unable to escape the effects of the settlement 
terms.  Many of the consumers who are injured as a result of a Paragraph IV settlement have no 
legal recourse under the indirect purchaser rule, and even the ones who are entitled to bring an 
antitrust action may not have access to relevant information. 
The proposed procedure modeled after Rule 23(e) attempts to alleviate some of the 
problems surrounding the parties to Paragraph IV settlements.  Most significantly, it provides a 
process through which settling parties can obtain judicial approval of their agreement.  Once 
approved, an agreement is presumptively legal, which protects the settled parties from future 
antitrust scrutiny.  Moreover, since courts would be required to issue an opinion describing their 
reasons for approval or disapproval of each proposed agreement, settling parties would be able to 
utilize past court decisions as a guide to structure their agreement.   
The proposed procedure also addresses some of the public’s concerns.  First, settling parties 
would be required to submit their proposed agreement to the court before they can settle.  The 
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court has the authority to reject any anticompetitive agreement and therefore prevent antitrust 
injury to the public.  Second, settling parties must also submit any ancillary agreements in 
connection with their proposed agreement.  This obviates the need for interested members of the 
public to search for related side deals.  If settling parties fail to disclose any material information, 
their agreement would lose its presumptive legality.  Third, the proposed procedure provides an 
opportunity for members of the public to object to a proposed agreement before it goes into effect.  
Fourth, the settling parties must adhere to a strict timeline, and the parties’ options become limited 
once they express their intent to settle.  This prevents the parties’ ability to manipulate the 
settlement procedure. 
The proposed procedure is intended to improve certainty as to the antitrust legality of 
Paragraph IV settlements and prevent unnecessary injury to the public.  This Comment makes no 
claim that the proposed procedure is ideal, and it would likely require further adjustments.  
Nonetheless, the current mechanisms for settlement and antitrust enforcement do not adequately 
balance the competing needs to promote pharmaceutical innovation and public welfare.  A more 
preemptive and drastic approach is necessary and desirable. 
